Normativity can be defined as the use of moral and/or ideological assumptions within a certain social context. Such a normativity is also present within academics. For instance, think about the norms regarding academic integrity, the code of conduct, etc. The given of normativity, both as a starting point and as an object of study, has always played an important role within theology, where a certain religion or faith is usually leading. This has led to the situation where normativity, in the sense of confessional conviction, could even be leading for the theological discipline, resulting in Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox theology faculties. Partly in response to this hyper-normativity, religious studies emerged. Religious studies did not include a certain faith, Christian denomination, or religion in the study of the phenomenon of religion. They were thereby pretended to be a more ‘objective’ approach towards religion, where normativity did not play a role, or at least a significantly less important role.

After the rise of postmodernism, this objective character was questioned. Was not every study determined by a non-objective framework? Did not every text have a certain context? In other words, was this not one subjectivity opposing another? This debate was later renamed, based on concepts derived from cultural anthropology, as emic and etic. The first is the so-called view from the inside, the latter the view from the outside. The first struggles to indicate overarching structures; the second struggles to follow the internal debate of a culture/discipline. One of the consequences of this ongoing debate was that the issues of normativity was transformed into the question of the origins of a certain perspective and its validity. To limit myself to an example outside of theology, the University of Hull abolished the demand for correct spelling and English grammar, because this perspective was seen as ‘homogenous, North European, white, male, and elite’. In sum, normativity plays an important role in social and academic life. 

This last argument indicates that normativity has also started to play a role in discussions around matters such as diversity and inclusivity. This is understandable, because the aim for greater diversity in important positions of our society has a normative character in itself. For example, there are explicit aims for more female professors and a broader representation of minorities in said positions. This is connected with awareness of the fact that every majority (on the basis of gender, sexuality, race) comes with blind spots/biases, which potentially devaluate the value of acquired knowledge and social events (Black Pete in the Netherlands, slavery). The normative aspect of the required emic approach, however, might also lead to excluding other groups (cancelling) and therefore stresses the specific and non-sharable aspect of one’s own identity (essentialism instead of performativity and/or narrativity). For example, see the debate in the Netherlands and France on the translation of Amanda Gorman’s poem. The old ideal of the wish/necessity to put oneself in someone else’s position is then seen as impossible. Surprisingly, the ideal of diversity then leads to a similar focus on (the inaccessibility of) one’s own identity as is currently used by extreme-right parties: les extrêmes se touchent.

 In the spectrum of theology / religious studies, the approach of religious studies can be seen as a conscious effort to distance ourselves from our own identity and create common ground where knowledge and understanding can flourish. Confessional theology, however, is under pressure as a result of an increasing tendency towards orthodoxy, implying a focus on one’s own identity. Within the latter context, normativity is not seen as a potential weakness in studying religion, but as a strength. This tendency towards orthodoxy has turned into a building block for individual bubbles. Unsurprisingly, Nevertheless, the original debate about the difference between theology and religious studies has been broadened to an academy-wide debate on diversity and inclusion. Inclusion can, on the one hand, mean the adoption of ‘forgotten’ perspectives, but on the other hand also the tendency towards creating an individual bubble. On the latter, this leads to resistance from governments (France, UK), which create counter pressure. While doing so, they do not solely focus on iconic issues such as spelling or toppling statues, but specifically on laws concerning certain religious movements. For instance, think about the limiting of financing of mosques by foreign powers, think about the ban on attracting imams from abroad rather than calling on imams educated by national institutions. This pressure and counter pressure lead to a new debate about the scope of the freedom of religion.

Normativity, then, becomes a debate about fundamental freedoms and their backgrounds. After all, freedom as defined by the French Revolution is different from freedom as defined by some 19th-century politicians who opted for the freedom to stress one’s individual identity (thus potentially creating one individual bubble) and rejected the concept of freedom as defined by the French Revolution. In that sense, today’s debate is paralleling that 19th-century debate.

Conclusion. Normativity plays in many areas of today’s society but has led to fierce debates both in the past and present, mainly in the field of religion. Religion then moves outside the confessional domain, but becomes an auctor in the social domain.

Prof. dr. Smalbrugge