DIGITAL RELIGION[1] AND CORONA
I Introduction
· The theme of digital religion has been chosen in order to reflect on recent developments in Europe due to the Covid-19 virus. Besides, it has been chosen to reflect on long term transformations in our society. This implies we want to catch up with recent developments that possibly might change essential features of the structures of modern religion in Europe.
· Therefore, to start with, some observations are needed to flesh out the topic of digital religion. Next, these observations will be followed by a summary containing some sparks of analysis. Finally this will be followed by some questions to discuss. The observations will divided into three main topics: polarities, authority and narratives.
· A caveat is needed when having a closer look at this content hub. The observations below are not represent the product of scholarly research. They represent what has been gathered in the societal discourse.
II. Observations, first part: polarities
Within the domain of individualism, we can observe the first polarities. Think of the antagonism between individualism and community, individualism and commercialization as well as individualism and freedom. Next to this, there is also the question of the transformation of communities, which on the one hand have ben put aside, on the other hand have to face pluralism. Below, we will expand on these themes.
1. Individualism. Digitalization as practiced during the Covid-19 crisis can be considered as the continuation of an already existing and prevailing individualism[2]. Society has since long been described as individualistic and many authors have demonstrated how this individualism is linked to other cultural phenomena such as perfectionism, consumerism, empowerment, particular aesthetics, sacralization of the individual etc.[3] The possibly negative aspects of this complicated landscape have also been largely investigated and have been brought to the fore. According to the latter studies, what happens with modern individualism is that individualism is more or less a masquerade[4], it is not real. Companies such as the GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) suggest that individuals matter (FB), they do not, they are considered as a group representing a particular market, e.g. the market of the millennials[5]. Moreover, research is conducted on Churches online in Times of corona (the project CONTOC), in which one of the main theses to be investigated is that ‘Digitalisierung verstärkt soziale Unterschiede, auch im kirchlichen Bereich’.
Secondly, though individualism normally speaking represents an emphasis on personal choices, on personal liberty etc., these aspects have largely disappeared in corona-times. One is no longer free to realize one’s own choices, but one is forced and ‘reduced’ to an individual existence, neatly separated from other individual existences by the law of social distancing. This time, individualism cannot be associated with a libertarian society but with state regulation.
Thirdly, corona-times have urged in an unexpected manner people to reconsider the relation between individuality and collectivity[6]. This is far from being a new topic, individualism is e.g. strongly related to Christianity and its insistence on the importance of the ‘inner man’ or the ‘self’ and its relationship with communities[7]. Therefore, research on the relation between collectivity and individualism has since long been conducted within the sphere of Christianity. In this context, it may be useful to point at countercurrents in modern individualism. There is, partly due to the corona-crisis, an increasing appeal to solidarity. Next to this, there also is a plea for more societal cohesion as well as a plea for the discovery of new sources of resilience.
Finally, regarding ‘religious digitalization’, religions had already entered the digital space and in that sense the current crisis only urged religious communities to catch up with these developments. As digitalization in the field of religion was already closely interwoven with individualism, the religious variant of individualism apparently has no specific characteristics compared to other aspects of societal life.
2. Collectivity put aside. The actual crisis has put aside in many ways the civil society. Parliament convenes in a very restricted way, meetings have been cancelled and religious services have been prohibited or strongly restricted. Stepped structures have been undermined and what is left is a bifocal structure of the top and the bottom. This phenomenon is clearly visible inside the churches: the gathering of a congregation is no longer possible and what is left, is the individual looking at services celebrated only by the priest or minister. In fact, only the extremes remain: the hierarchy and the individual believer. In theological terms, the community/koinonia disappeared. This may have different consequences. On the one hand one may point at the risk of delocalization and centralization of ecclesiastical life. It may foster personal preferences for a certain type of community, whereas belonging to one’s ‘natural’ community (the parish/congregation one belongs to officially) may suddenly seem a less preferable option. It is a process that is comparable to the functioning of the free market. The existing religious communities can be become ‘customized’, which will have consequences for their structure in the future, e.g. for their financial sustainability[8]. On the other hand, it will obscure the important role women and lay people hold in the daily life of, e.g., the RCC, without them having an official place in the hierarchy. This may have consequences when it comes to reestablishing the balance between local and universal. The RCC, as well as other churches, is facing indeed in a accelerated way the challenge of pluralism[9]. But still, one should recognize that these kind of developments, in particular the disappearance of the old parochial model, were already on their way for decades[10].
Next, it is obvious that this disappearance of the role of the community in society may threaten democratic structures in our society. Parliament e.g. tends to avoid being in the way of the government. It is for that reason that criticism has been voiced, since the outbreak of the crisis, regarding the threat democratic structures may face. There has also been warned against the possibility of the abuse of power (Hungary, Poland)[11]. Next to this, the attention was drawn to the need to reinforce civil society[12]. These observations insist on the fact that liberal democracy was already going through a crisis[13] and in that sense, corona-times have only reinforced this crisis.
III. Observations, second part: authority
1. Authority. One of the possible consequences of these threats to democracy, is a transformation of the structures of power and/or authority. Officially, the main societal structure in Europe is currently that of a national state, based on a democratic framework. However, the influence of companies such as the GAFA (Google, Amazon, FB, Apple) seem to be overwhelming, though not always visible. This possibly undermines democratic structures. Authority then transforms itself in a hardly visible dynamic. On the other hand, the fact that nations have behaved as competitors may foster a revival of nationalism, based on less democratic structures than we were used to. This is also a development that is already visible and in that case current national structures of authority will remain present, even reinforced. It is deglobalization at a social, political and economic level. However, this return to the nation state is also a recurrent phenomenon, at least since the refugee crisis[14]. This transformation can also happen in the field of religion. The question can be raised whether religious authorities are able to inspire, to protect and to organize their spiritual communities without falling in the trap of nationalism. This goes for the Islam[15], but also for Christianity (again, Poland, Hungary). However, counterforces such as the tendency to centralization may prevent such developments. Current religious structures of authority may also benefit from the actual crisis, as they remain the most visible element present in times normal gatherings are not possible. This may enhance a certain centralism, possibly also a tendency towards greater conservatism.
2. Increasing influence of the extremes. Focusing more specifically on corona than on digital religion, one may observe that this loss of a civil society structure strengthens the role of the extremes: individual and higher officials, that is what is left at a social level, as we already noticed sub II,2. At least, this is what happens at a political and religious level: heads of state e.g. addressing the nation on TV. But it strengthens no less, at a political level, the tensions inside Europe in another sense: in Southern Europe as well as in Northern Europe politicians fear that this crisis may benefit right wing, populist, parties. This fear of another kind of extremes is one of the main elements that actually create a dangerous tension between the different parts of Europe[16]. Not only between North and South (Germany and the Netherlands versus Spain, Italy and France), but also between West and East (Poland and Hungary versus the majority of the Western countries). The debate on the ‘coronabonds’ or ‘recoverybonds’ can be seen as the next phase in an already running fight on the essentials of the European cooperation, revealing once more the disagreement on the very nature of European solidarity[17]. Once again, one can only point at the fact that these developments are not produced by the actual corona-times, but that they have been intensified and strengthened. However, populism is perhaps not very likely to be the winner of this game[18]. Most of the populist leaders have underestimated the importance of Corona and their lack of leadership has been clearly visible. Traditional parties and their leaders, on the contrary, have proven to be trustworthy[19].
3. Fragmentation. Digitalization entails fragmentation, which is a process of a larger size than digitalization in itself. As a whole, the increasing power of the extremes revealed new divisions between European countries. It was not only at the level of financial aid, it showed up at many levels. Obviously, it was every man for himself, in particular when it came to medical necessities. European countries were in competition with each other and Italy was left to Chinese help amidst a terrible crisis. This attitude — let’s call it selfishness — is visible at a societal, economic and political level. It produced threatening fragmentation of Europe against which even the pope warned in his latest Easter mass.
IV. Observations, third part: narratives
1. Narratives. Different narratives try to explain the digitalization of our society. Certainly once it is combined with the theme of AI. We then come across interpretations such as those of Homo Deus or the Replacement of Man. Basically, those narratives are not only analyses or projections, but also strong emotional actors. They provide fear, anxiety, hope, mistrust, and so on. At the same time, the corona-narrative has become a fight between China and the US, fueling thus the already existing trade war between the two countries. This narrative comes close to narratives based on the idea of society ending up in apocalyptic times. These apocalyptic narratives tend to combine several aspects of modern life, such as the climate crisis, political instability and so on. Most of these narratives have in common that the cause of this crisis is to be allotted to the ‘Other’ in his many forms[20]. The phenomenon of ‘othering’ is well-known in the realm of religion and it touches upon the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion. On the other hand, digitalization offers new possibilities and traditional dividing lines can easily be overcome. Religious services e.g. become more accessible to all kind of people, regardless of their confessional background. The quantity of narratives is a large one
V. Summary
1. Keeping these observations in mind, we may conclude that the main developments linked to corona are in fact developments that were already present. This goes in particular for the digitalization of religion. Whether they concern individualism, the rise of nationalism, the transformation of traditional authorities and structures of civil society, they were all already present before corona-times. However, they have shown an unexpected acceleration.
2. The most striking aspect seems to be fragmentation as the phenomenon creating new outlooks of religion and society. On the one hand it can favor nationalism, on the other it can also lead to centralization, unexpected cohesion or solidarity. The latter can be seen as filling the vacuum left once civil society and traditional structures of religious communities have been put aside.
3. Therefore, though individualism seems to be leading, it is precisely because of the fragmentation it entails that it undermines its own values. Moreover, the actual crisis may well contribute to enlarging the social differences. Modern individualism therefore creates a vulnerable individual that can be manipulated by political and economic stakeholders. Neoliberalism still suggests the importance of individual and free choices, but at the same time it destroys these free choices. Digitalization of religion is no exception to this development.
4. Indeed, religion is part of larger dynamics. Centralization can entail a weakening of the traditional religious structures, .e.g. in the RCC, in which women and lay-people hold an important role. It can even be argued that, in order to create solidarity, the interests of the individual have to be put aside. Therefore, what we are witnessing is the phenomenon of individualism producing fragmentation and thus provoking centralization. Centralization in its turn may function as the renewed expression of an identity policy. Moreover, the increasing need of solidarity may unexpectedly also weaken the structures of local religious communities. Subsequently, this tendency to centralization may provoke on the one hand the rise of new structures of local religious communities (developing also new ecclesiologies), on the other hand a tightening of the existing structures (identity policy).
5. All these structures will confront us with the problem of values. Which are the values we should live by as religious communities and how can we foster European solidarity? In the case of digitalization, what is the balance between individual and collectivity? The problem of values is however a complicated one. Modern individualism impedes the creation of a common moral ground. Yet, if that is indeed the case and if digitalization would foster pluralism, how can we avoid the reaction of religions wanting to shape the debate on values?
6. In sum, this crisis confronts us with feelings of powerlessness, fragility and vulnerability, but also with feelings of solidarity and resilience. It confronts us with unexpected aspects of our lifestyle. To this crisis, we respond partly by social distancing and digitalization, but (once again) also with new forms of solidarity. Digitalization however raises questions concerning the individual: how is he linked or not to the different communities he is officially part of? Put in other words, what is the relationship between the individual and collectivity? This question goes in particular for religions. But religions share these questions with the broader fields of at least European politics. Therefore, the main question for religions is not to discover how we can develop new ecclesiologies, but how we can respond to the societal need of a set of values that allows us to foster solidarity as well as to respect individualism.
VI. Questions
- What are the religious developments/tendencies in your country when it comes to the dynamics described above (polarities, authority, narratives)?
- Do you see any particular tendencies when it comes to the domain of values?
- Do religions, in your country, take a political stand?
- Should our departments pronounce themselves regarding recent developments?
[1] We leave aside the difference between digital religion and digitalization of religion.
[2] Cp. PEW Research Center: In a typical week, about one-in-five Americans share their faith online. (PEW on May 4, 2020).
[3] Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Price of Perfection: Individualism and Society in the Era of Biomedical Enhancement, Baltimore 2009. Thomas M. Franck, The empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism, Oxford 2001
[4] Cp. Jia Tolentino, The Trick Mirror. Reflections on Self-Delusion, New-York 2019.
[5] Cp. Michael Perelman, Manufacturing Discontent: the Trap of Individualism in Corporate Society, London.
[6] Cp. Jeremy Gilbert, Common Ground: Democracy an Collectivity in an Age of Individualism, London 2014. Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing Economic Individualism, Washington 2007.
[7] Cp. Maureen P. Heath, The Christian Roots of Individualism, Cham (Swlnd) 2019.
[8] Cp. Heidi Schlumpf et al., The Church after coronavirus: Crisis expose what is essential, National Catholic Reporter 2/2/2020.
[9] Cp. Massimo Faggioli, Sorting out Catholicism: A Brief History of the New Ecclesiastical Movements, Collegeville, Minnesota 2014.
[10] Editoral team NCR, Editorial: in this forced retreat, are we asking big enough questions? National Catholic Reporter 22/4/2020.
[11] Cp. Serge Schmemann, The Virus comes for Democracy, NYT 2/4/2020. Florian Bieber, Authoritarianism in the Time of Coronavirus, Foreign Policy 30/3/2020. Lisa Hänel, Corona-virus: a Stress Test for Democracy, Deutsche Welle 8/4/2020.
[12] Cp. Itxu Díaz, Coronavirus is Forcing Europe to Redicover Civil Society, National Review 2/4/2020
[13] Cp. Hans Kundnani, The Future of Democracy in Europe, Chatham House March 2020
[14] Cp. A. Bakardjieva Engelbrekt et al., The European Union and the Return of the Nation Sate, London 2020.
[15] Cp. Bader Al-Saif, Ramadan to test Religious elements of Saudi Pandemic Response, Carnegie Middle East Center 22/4/2020. Frederic Wehrey et al., Islamic Authority and Arabic States in a Time of Pandemic, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 16/4/2020.
[16] Cp. Victor Mallet, FT Interview : Emmanuel Macron says it’s time to think the unthinkable, Financial Times 16/4/2020.
[17] Cp. Maxime Vaudano, ‘Coronabonds’: comprendre la bataille des mots qui cache le vrai débat sur la solidarité européenne, Le Monde 4/5/2020. Ulrich Ladurner, Das kalte Nein aus den Niederlanden, Die Zeit 8/4/2020. Ulrich Ladurner, Coronabond. Reflexe aud der Eurokrise, Die Zeit, 7/4/2020
[18] NN, AfD rutscht unter zehn Prozent, FAZ 23/3/2020
[19] NN, Zufriendenheit mit Bundesregierung wächst in Corona-Krise sprunghaft, FAZ 2/4/2020.
[20] Roy Peter Clark, The coronavirusnarrative is that it came from the ‘other’. It’s predictable, dangerous and wrong, Poynter 13/4/2020.